On July 8, Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarks on a three-day visit to Russia and Austria. This marks his first official trip abroad since commencing his third consecutive term as India’s prime minister last month. Usually, Modi’s initial foreign visits focus on neighboring countries, reflecting the importance of India’s regional diplomacy. However, opting for Russia and Austria this time stands out as an intriguing choice, meriting a deeper examination of the potential motives behind this decision.
In a rapidly evolving global landscape, India seeks to diversify its partnerships, strategically aligning with various nations to maximize benefits for New Delhi. For instance, amid Western opposition due to the Ukraine crisis, India has continued to procure Russian oil at reduced prices. Notably, Modi is bypassing the 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Kazakhstan, which President Putin is set to attend, casting uncertainty on his participation in the upcoming BRICS summit in Moscow later this year.
Modi’s visit to Russia amidst the ongoing Ukraine war carries significant implications and might serve to address several issues. This visit represents Modi’s first trip to Russia since 2018 and comes at a critical time when President Putin faces a dearth of steadfast allies and friends. Despite holding annual summits since 2000, the Russia-India meetings had seen interruptions in recent years. President Putin visited New Delhi in 2021, but the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, strained Russia’s relations with Western countries. A meeting between Modi and Putin did occur in 2022, but it took place at the SCO gathering in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, where Modi famously told Putin, “This is not an era of war.”
The longstanding relationship between New Delhi and Moscow, particularly cemented by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, has evolved over the decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 necessitated a redefinition of their bilateral ties. The annual summits have been pivotal in maintaining this dynamic relationship, especially as global contexts shift. Defence and energy sectors have been central pillars of this partnership. However, with India’s growing economic influence, there has been a discernible pivot towards Western nations for technology and investment.
Simultaneously, Russia’s increasing proximity to China, India’s strategic rival, especially after the 2014 Crimea annexation, poses a concern for New Delhi.
. The Russia-China camaraderie, solidified by the declaration of a “friendship without limits” just days before the Ukraine invasion, has heightened India’s apprehensions, particularly in light of ongoing border tensions with China.
Against this backdrop, reinforcing political dialogues and bolstering economic ties with Russia is imperative. Many of India’s military needs, especially spare parts for its predominantly Russian-origin aircraft fleet, underscore the necessity of maintaining robust defense cooperation. Though venturing into defense procurements from other nations, India still significantly depends on Russia for critical supplies, including the remaining S-400 air defense system units and replacements for Sukhoi fighter jets.
Despite Russia’s historical role as a dependable defense partner, India’s wary of potential delays in spare parts or the sharing of sensitive technology with China or Pakistan. Thus, striking a balance in its engagements with Russia and Western allies remains a crucial strategy for New Delhi.
Moreover, sustaining favorable relations with Russia could be advantageous if former President Donald Trump reclaims the US presidency. Given Trump’s amiable past with Putin and the tense dynamics between Putin and the current Biden administration, Modi’s rapport with Russia could pay dividends under a potential second Trump administration.
Additionally, Putin’s recent defense pact with North Korea raises alarms for New Delhi, which has long been troubled by North Korea’s defense relations with Pakistan. The possibility of advanced defense and space technology transfer from North Korea to Pakistan heightens concerns for India, especially given historical precedents of missile technology exchanges between these nations.
The imminent logistics support agreement between India and Russia, enabling expanded naval operations including access to Russian naval bases, is a strategic milestone. This aligns with similar agreements India has with Japan, Australia, and the US, facilitating greater maritime reach.
Finally, Modi’s visit might also serve as a diplomatic conduit between the West and Russia. India has previously played an intermediary role, aiding the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative to ensure safe grain transport amidst the Ukraine conflict. With bilateral ties with both conflicting parties, India could potentially foster negotiations to deescalate the Ukraine war, especially if US support for Ukraine wanes post-November elections, a scenario Europe seems unprepared to handle alone.
In summation, the multifaceted dimensions of Modi’s trip underscore India’s nuanced geopolitical balancing act. By navigating these complex international waters, New Delhi aims to fortify its strategic interests and bolster its influence on the global stage.
